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AExpansions in Maternity Leave
Coverage and Mothers’ Labor
Market Outcomes after Childbirth
Uta Scho¨nberg, University College London and Institute
for Employment Research
Johannes Ludsteck, Institute for Employment ResearchThis article analyzes the impact of five major expansions in mater-
nity leave coverage inGermany onmothers’ labormarket outcomes
after childbirth. To identify the causal impact of the reforms, we use
a difference-in-difference design that compares labor market out-
comes of mothers who give birth shortly before and shortly after a
change in maternity leave legislation in years of policy changes and
years when no changes have taken place. Each expansion in leave
coverage reduced mothers’ postbirth employment rates in the short
run. The longer-run effects of the expansions onmothers’ postbirth
labor market outcomes are, however, small.
I. Introduction
At present, almost every country has provisions for maternity leave al-
lowing mothers to leave their workplace for a limited time around child-
birth and giving them the right to return to their previous employer
afterward. However, these provisions vary widely across countries. Since
the introduction of the Family and Medical Leave Act ðFMLAÞ in 1993,
roughly 60% of women in the United States are entitled to 12 weeks of
unpaid maternity leave. In Germany, in contrast, women are currentlyWe thank Mark Bils, Gordon Dahl, Christian Dustmann, Ronni Pavan, and
various seminar participants for helpful comments and suggestions. Contact the
corresponding author, Uta Scho¨nberg, at u.schoenberg@ucl.ac.uk.
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Aeligible for 3 years of partially paid leave. There is a recent trend toward
an expansion in leave coverage. For instance, Canada increased paid fam-
ily leave from about 25 weeks to 50 weeks in 2000. In 2004, California
strengthened maternity rights, allowing for up to 6 months of maternity
leave. Other countries that have recently extended their leave coverage
include the United Kingdom ð2003, 2007Þ and Denmark ð2002Þ.1
Despite the widespread prevalence of parental leave policies, their eco-
nomic impact is not fully understood. Proponents argue that these poli-
cies promote gender equality and increase women’s earnings as they allow
mothers to retain valuable firm- or occupation-specific human capital and
match-specific search capital after childbirth. Proponents further argue that
leave policies improve the mother’s health and the child’s welfare, through
a reduction in early maternal employment. Opponents counter that leave
policies may worsen women’s position in the labor market, for at least two
reasons. First, more time away fromwork after childbirth could in fact lower
women’s future labormarket attachment andwages becauseof human capital
depreciation while away from work.2 Second, expansions in maternity leave
coverage may make it more costly for employers to hire women of child-
bearing age relative to men. Employers may respond by hiring fewer women
or by lowering their wages.3
This article investigates the impact on women’s labor market outcomes
after childbirth of five major expansions in maternity leave coverage in
Germany. The policy reforms differ with respect to the expansion of the
job protection period relative to that of the maternity benefit period. The
overall goal of the reforms was to facilitate the compatibility of family and
career. The reforms were explicitly aimed at encouraging mothers to spend
more time with their infants after childbirth, a time that is crucial for the
child’s development. A further goal of the reforms was to strengthen the
long-term position of mothers in the labor market by making it easier for
them to reenter the labor market after childbirth.1 See Ray ð2008Þ for documentation of parental leave policies in countries in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
2 See, e.g., Albrecht et al. ð1999Þ, Anderson, Binder, and Krause ð2002Þ, and
Spivey ð2005Þ for an empirical analysis on the effects of career interruptions due
to childbirth on women’s postbirth wages. Ejrnaes and Kunze ð2013Þ provide a
similar analysis for Germany, exploiting arguably exogenous variation in time
away fromwork induced by the expansions in parental leave to estimate the human
capital depreciation rate.
3 Ruhm ð1998Þ analyzes these effects by exploiting variation in maternity leave
coverage across time and across nine European countries ðsee also Ruhm and Teague
1997Þ. He concludes that more generous leave policies are associated with increased
employment but with lower wages of women relative tomen. Gruber ð1994Þ studies
the impact of mandates that increased employers’ relative costs of insuring women
of childbearing age. He finds that employers are able to shift much of these costs to
the wages of women.
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AThe German context provides us with a unique opportunity to evaluate
the effects of parental leave policies on mothers’ postbirth careers. First,
we are able to investigate a series of policy changes as opposed to a single,
specific reform. This allows us to isolate the impact of a job guarantee
from that of maternity benefit payments and to assess whether extensions
of a short leave period ðlike reform 1, which increased the job protection
and maternity benefit period from 2 to 6 months after childbirthÞ affect
mothers’ postbirth labor market outcomes differently from extensions of,
by international standards, a long leave period ðlike reform 4, which in-
creased the job protection period from 18 to 36 months and left the ma-
ternity benefit period unchanged at 18 months after childbirthÞ.
Second, since we observe the entire work history of all mothers who
ever signed up for maternity leave, we are able to identify the causal effect
of the reforms in a clean way by comparing postbirth labor market out-
comes of mothers who give birth shortly before or shortly after ð3 months
in our baseline specificationÞ a change in maternity leave legislation.4 In
order to disentangle the effect of the policy reforms from possible seasonal
effects, we use as a control group mothers who give birth in the same
months but in years in which no reform took place.
A similar analysis is not possible using policy variation for the United
States because, in contrast to Germany, there was only one federal reform
ðthe 1993 FMLAÞ, which entitles roughly 60% of mothers to 12 weeks of
unpaid maternity leave.5 A similar analysis is not possible either for most
other countries that have recently expanded maternity leave coverage
ðsuch as CanadaÞ because reforms have not been as numerous or because
data are of lower quality than in Germany.6 The paper most closely related
to ours, Lalive et al. ð2011Þ, evaluates the effects of three reforms in ma-
ternity leave coverage in Austria on mothers’ postbirth labor market ca-4 An earlier study by Ondrich, Spiess, and Yang ð2003Þ and Ondrich et al. ð2003Þ
evaluates the impact of the post-1986 expansions in leave coverage on mothers’
postbirth outcomes using the German Socioeconomic Panel. However, their sam-
ple is too small to permit this identification strategy. Several papers, including Wald-
fogel ð1998Þ,Higuchi,Waldfolgel, andAbe ð1999Þ, Berger andWaldfogel ð2004Þ, and
Hashimoto et al. ð2004Þ, examine the effect of maternity leave coverage that is pro-
vided voluntarily by employers as opposed to maternity leave coverage that is man-
dated by the government. This approach may not uncover the causal impact of ma-
ternity leave coverage on women’s postbirth careers as women may self-select into
jobs that provide generous maternity leave coverage. Hashimoto et al. show that this
selection into jobs that provide leave coverage is important.
5 Studies that evaluate the impact of the FMLA on women’s postbirth labor
market outcomes include Klerman and Leibowitz ð1997, 1999Þ, Waldfogel ð1999Þ,
and Baum ð2003a, 2003bÞ. While there is some evidence that the reform induced
some women to postpone their return to work, there is little evidence that the
reform affected mothers’ employment rates or wages in the long run.
6 For instance, Baker andMilligan ð2008aÞ evaluate a wide range of expansions in
leave coverage in Canada. However, their identification strategy relies on much
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Areers, using an identification strategy similar to ours. All three reforms
affected the job protection or maternity benefit period after the child’s
first birthday. Unlike us, Lalive et al. are therefore not able to investigate
expansions in leave coverage before the child’s first birthday.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Each expansion in
maternity leave coverage induced some women to delay their return to
work. Hence, the reforms succeeded in increasing the time mothers spend
at home with their infants after childbirth, which was an important goal
of the reforms. The impact of the reforms on overall maternal employ-
ment is, however, small. For instance, reform 2—which increased the job
protection and maternity benefit period by 4 months—led to a reduction
in maternal employment through the first 6 years after childbirth of only
about 1 month. Reform 3—which extended the maternity benefit period
from 6 to 22 months and the job protection period from 6 to 10 months
after childbirth—had the strongest impact on maternal employment and
lowered maternal employment through the first 6 years after childbirth
by almost 3 months.
With regard to the long-run effects of the expansions in leave coverage,
four out of the five expansions in leave coverage had almost no impact
on mothers’ employment rates and labor market income 3–6 years after
childbirth. A common feature of these reforms is that the job protection
period is as long as or exceeds the maternity benefit period. In contrast,
reform 3—which extended the maternity benefit period beyond the job
protection period and caused the strongest overall reduction in maternal
employment—somewhat worsened mothers’ position in the labor market.
The reform discouraged up to 4% of mothers from returning to work by
their child’s sixth birthday and lowered their labor market income 6 years
after childbirth by roughly 8%. Although the state government spent
approximately DM 6,000 ðin 1995 pricesÞ per mother, on average, on ad-
ditional maternity benefit payments, mothers’ cumulative total income, in-
cluding that frommaternity benefit payments, declined by almostDM4,000
6 years after childbirth. These findings point to the importance of the job
guarantee in avoiding long-lasting negative effects of expansions in leave
coverage on mothers’ postbirth careers. To conclude, the reforms did not
succeed in promoting employment continuity or in improving the position
of women in the labor market after childbirth.stronger assumptions than ours, and their data prevent them from studying the
long-run effects of the expansions. Baker andMilligan ð2008b, 2010Þ and Hanratty
and Trzcinski ð2009Þ investigate a single reform in Canada that raised the leave
period from20 to 52weeks.Unlike us, they are not able to identify the causal impact
of the reform by comparing mothers who give birth shortly before or shortly after
the expansion.
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AThe article is structured as follows. We begin with a description of the
major changes in maternity leave legislation in Germany ðSec. II.AÞ. We
then briefly discuss the mechanisms through which expansions inmaternity
leave coverage may affect mothers’ labor market outcomes ðSec. II.BÞ. We
outline the empirical strategy in Section III and describe the data in Section
IV. We report results in Section V and conclude with a discussion of our
findings in Section VI.
II. Background
A. Maternity Leave Legislation in Germany
In the United States, the FMLA introduced in 1993 requires firms with
at least 50 employees to provide 12 weeks of unpaid leave after childbirth.
In Germany, mothers have been entitled to paid leave 6 weeks before and
8 weeks after childbirth since the mid-1950s.7 During the leave period, the
firm is not allowed to dismiss the mother, and the mother has the right to
return to a job that is comparable to the job she held before childbirth.
Payment during this period is equivalent to her average income over the
3 months prior to childbirth ðaround DM 2,238, in 1985 prices, in 1985,
the middle of our sample periodÞ, corresponding to a 100% replacement
rate. The public health insurance, the federal government, and the em-
ployer contribute to the mother’s payment during this period. The health
insurance pays DM 750 per month, while the federal government pro-
vides DM 400 as a one-time payment. The remaining costs ðabout DM
1,288 per month, on average, in 1985Þ are borne by the employer.
Starting in the late 1970s, Germany experienced a series of largely un-
expected expansions in leave coverage. Figure 1 provides a visual overview
of the main reforms. The first reform took place in May 1979 and raised
the job protection maternity leave period from 8 weeks to 6 months after
childbirth. Payment between 6 weeks before and 8 weeks after childbirth
remained unchanged from the mother’s average income over the 3 months
prior to childbirth. From the third month after childbirth onward, pay-
ment was DM 750 per month, or about 44% of average prebirth earnings
in 1979 ðown calculations based on Social Security recordsÞ. Only women
who were employed before childbirth were entitled to maternity benefits.
Maternity benefits from the third month onward are paid solely by the
federal government.
In January 1986, the job protection and maximum maternity benefit
period was increased from 6 months to 10 months, and a further increase
to 12 months starting in January 1988 was announced. An important7 The following description of the expansions in maternity leave coverage in
Germany is based on Zmarzlik, Zipperer, and Viethen ð1999Þ.
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FIG. 1.—Overview of policy reforms. Since 1986, all women—employed before
childbirth or not—are entitled to a maternity benefit of DM 600 per month for a
minimum of 6 months. Frommonth 7 onward, maternity benefits are means tested
and depend on the annual net family income 2 years before childbirth. The ma-
jority of women receive benefits longer than 6 months. In January 1988, the job
protection and maternity benefit periods were extended from 10 to 12 months
Two further changes occurred in July 1989 and July 1990, when the job protection
and maternity benefit periods were increased to 15 and 18 months, respectively.
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Acomponent of this reform was that all mothers, regardless of employment
status before childbirth, became entitled to maternity benefits. A further
component was that fathers became eligible for parental leave. However,
only a few fathers sign up for parental leave ðless than 1.5% in 1992; see
Vaskovics and Rost ½1999 for a detailed studyÞ. Maternity payment from
6 weeks before to 8 weeks after childbirth remained once again unchanged
from the mother’s income prior to childbirth ðor DM 600 per month if the
mother was not working before childbirthÞ. From the third to the sixth
month after childbirth, maternity benefits declined from DM 750 to DM
600 per month. This corresponds to about 26% of average prebirth earn-
ings in 1986. Frommonths 7 to 10, maternity benefits weremeans tested and
depended on the annual net family income during the 2 years before child-
birth. Themajority of women received the full maternity benefit ofDM600
for 10 months; in 1986, for example, this proportion was 83.6% ðBundes-
ministerium fu¨r Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2000Þ.
At the same time, one large state in southern Germany, Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg, introduced an additional maternity benefit of DM 400 per
month. The benefit is paid by the state government for 12 months. Pay-
ment starts at the end of the federal benefit period. Hence, in Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg, the job protection period was increased from 6 to 10 months
while the maternity benefit period was effectively extended from 6 to 22
months.
In July 1989 and July 1990, the job protection and maximum maternity
benefit periods were further lengthened to 15 and 18 months, respectively.
The final policy reform took place in January 1992, when job-protected
leave was increased from 18 to 36 months. Maternity payments still ended
at 18 months but were to be extended to 24 months a year later, in January
1993.
Our empirical analysis focuses on five reforms in maternity leave cov-
erage that differ with respect to the expansion of the job protection rela-
tive to that of the maternity leave period ðsee also fig. 1Þ. The 1979 and
1986 ðexcluding Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ reforms—which we refer to as re-
form 1 and reform 2 throughout the article—are examples of expansions
in leave coverage that increased the job protection and maternity benefit
periods by the same amount. The 1986 reform in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg ðre-
form 3Þ, in contrast, raised the maternity benefit period by more than the
job protection period. This allows us to analyze the impact of maternity
benefit payments that are not job protected. The 1992 reform ðreform 4Þ
increased the job protection period by 18 months but left the maternity
benefit period unchanged, whereas the 1993 reform ðreform 5Þ increased the
maternity benefit period by 6 months but left the job protection period
unchanged. These reforms allow us to disentangle the impact of job pro-
tection from that of maternity benefits on mothers’ labor market outcomesThis content downloaded from 128.041.009.229 on December 11, 2017 08:41:22 AM
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Aafter childbirth. When evaluating reforms 4 and 5, we exclude from our
sample mothers who give birth in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg.8
B. Mechanisms and Motivation of Outcome Variables
How do expansions in maternity leave coverage affect mothers’ labor
market outcomes after childbirth? Most importantly, an extension of the
job protection as well as of the maternity benefit period provides incen-
tives for mothers to stay away from work during that period ðsee, e.g.,
Klerman and Leibowitz 1997Þ. Note that mothers value job protection
ðwithout the provision of benefitsÞ only in a labor market with search
frictions in which it takes time to find a job or it is difficult to find a job
that provides the same utility as the prebirth job. This could be either be-
cause of firm-, occupation-, or task-specific human capital or because of
match-specific search capital. Since the value of staying at home drops dis-
continuously when maternity benefits are exhausted or when job protection
ends, we expect a spike in mothers’ return behavior at the end of the job
protection period as well as at the end of the maternity benefit period ðpro-
vided that the job protection period exceeds the maternity benefit period so
that women have a job to return to at maternity benefit exhaustionÞ.9
Why may expansions in maternity leave coverage affect women’s labor
force participation rates in the long run, after the job protection and ma-
ternity benefit periods have ended? There are two opposing effects. On the
one hand, an expansion in leave coverage may encourage employment con-
tinuity of mothers. To seewhy, take as an example reform 1, which increased
job-protected maternity leave from 2 to 6 months. Suppose that a mother is
not ready to go back to her prebirth employer 2months after childbirth, even
knowing that by not returning to her prebirth employer now, she will lose
the employment guarantee. Suppose that she is willing to return to her
prebirth employer 6 months after childbirth. The reason could be that her
utility of staying with her child declines with the child’s age. This woman
would be observed working 6 months after childbirth under the new legis-
lation but not necessarily under the old legislation since she may not have
found a job at all or since she may not have found a job that is as well paid as8 In Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, reform 4 increased the job protection period from 18
to 36 months and left the maternity benefit period unchanged at 30 ð18 1 12Þ
months after childbirth. Reform 5 left the job protection period unchanged at
36 months and extended the maternity benefit period from 30 to 36 ð24 1 12Þ
months after childbirth.
9 There might also be a spike in mothers’ return behavior at maternity benefit
exhaustion if the maternity benefit period exceeds the job protection period and
women therefore have no job lined up. This would correspond to a spike in the
job-finding hazard rate around the time unemployment benefits end. However,
Card, Raj, and Weber ð2007Þ show that while spikes in the unemployment exit
hazard rate at unemployment benefit exhaustion are common, spikes in the job-
finding hazard rate at benefit exhaustion are small.
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Aher prebirth job because of the loss in specific capital. On the other hand, an
expansion in leave coverage causes women to spend more time away from
work, and this delay may induce them to take even more time off from
work. Such a causal impact of time away from work on long-run partici-
pation rates could arise because of human capital depreciation: if women’s
employment opportunities decline with the time away from work, women
may become less and less likely to return to work the more time they spend
away from work.10 Alternatively, a mother may learn how enjoyable it is
to be with her child while on maternity leave, and spending more time with
her child may cause her to want to spend even more time with her child.
When analyzing the impact of the expansions in leave on mothers’ labor
supply after childbirth, we focus on three outcome variables. Our first
outcome variable is the probability that the mother has returned to work
by month t after childbirth. Since mothers may drop out of the labor mar-
ket after their return ðfor instance, because they have a second childÞ, we
consider the probability that the mother is working in month t after child-
birth as a second outcome variable. Here, we distinguish between full-time
and part-time work. Our third outcome variable, the number of months the
mother has worked through month t after childbirth, captures the overall
impact of the expansions in leave coverage on maternal employment.
Whymaymaternity leave policies affectwomen’s postbirth labormarket
income? The same two opposing effects described above are at work here.
On the one hand, since expansions in maternity leave coverage induce
women to postpone their return to work, women have less time to accu-
mulate labor market skills and may lose more skills while at home. On
the other hand, more generous leave policies may allow mothers to retain
firm- or occupation-specific human or search capital. This is the main
reason put forward in the literature forwhymaternity leave legislationmay
alleviate adverse effects of career interruptions ðe.g., Klerman and Lei-
bowitz 1997; Waldfogel 1998; Hashimoto et al. 2004Þ. Moreover, during
the job protection period,women arewilling to accept an outside offer only
if it dominates that of their prebirth employer ðas opposed to nonemploy-
mentÞ. This leads to a higher reservation wage. An increase in maternity
benefits has the same effect. Hence, an extension of the job protection or
maternity benefit period may raise wages also for women who return to an
outside employer after childbirth.
Moreover, expansions in leave coverage may affect the labor market in-
come of working mothers if they change the selection of mothers into
work. This is especially problematic if the expansions increased or lowered
mothers’ long-run attachment to the labor market after childbirth. In or-10 Of course, if mothers are aware that more time away from work makes them
less valuable in the labor market because of human capital depreciation, this will be
reflected in their reservation wage and hence their return behavior.
This content downloaded from 128.041.009.229 on December 11, 2017 08:41:22 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
478 Scho¨nberg/Ludsteck
Ader to avoid this concern, we include mothers who are not working in our
sample and set their monthly labor market income to zero. Hence, this
variable captures, in addition to the channels described above, the impact of
the reforms on mothers’ postbirth labor force participation rates. In order
to analyze whether the extended payment of maternity benefits finan-
cially compensated mothers for a potential loss in labor market income, we
also investigate the impact of the reforms on mothers’ cumulative total in-
come, including that from maternity benefit payments, obtained through
month t after childbirth.
III. Identiﬁcation Strategy
Weestimate the causal effectof anexpansion in leave coverageonmothers’
labor market outcomes using a difference-in-difference design. We first
compare outcomes ofmothers who give birth shortly before or shortly after
a change in maternity leave legislation ð3 months in our baseline specifi-
cationÞ. This simple difference leads to a biased estimate of the causal impact
of the reform if there are systematic differences between mothers who give
birth in different months; see, for example, Buckles and Hungerman ð2013Þ
for a recent analysis. In order to isolate the causal impact of the policy re-
form from such seasonal effects, we use as a control groupmothers who give
birth in the same months but in a year in which no reform took place. A
similar strategy has, for instance, been used by Lalive and Zweimu¨ller ð2009Þ
and Lalive et al. ð2011Þ to evaluate the impact of an Austrian policy reform
on mothers’ fertility and labor market outcomes and by Ekberg, Eriksson,
and Friebel ð2005Þ to analyze the impact of Sweden’s “daddymonth reform”
on the labor supply of fathers.
We estimate regressions of the following type on mothers who sign up
for maternity leave:11
YMotherit 5 a
ML
0t 1 a
ML
1t Cohorti 1 a
ML
2t Monthi
1 aML3t Cohorti Monthi 1 x0iaML4t 1 uMLit ;
ð1Þ
where x0i is a vector of mothers’ characteristics determined prior to child-
birth, Cohorti is an indicator variable equal to one if mother i belongs to
the cohort that was affected by the reform in maternity leave legislation
ðreferring, e.g., to mothers who give birth between October 1991 and
March 1992 in our baseline specification for reform 4Þ, Monthi is an indi-
cator variable equal to one if the mother gives birth in the months just
after the reform came into effect ðreferring, e.g., to mothers who give birth
between January andMarchÞ, and Cohorti Monthi is the interaction be-11 Our data do not allow us to identify women who give birth and do not sign up
for maternity leave; see Sec. IV.
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Atween these two variables ðreferring, e.g., to mothers who give birth be-
tween January and March 1992Þ. The coefficient on this interaction ðaML3t Þ
is the coefficient of interest and identifies the effect of an expansion in
maternity leave coverage on mothers’ labor market outcomes in month t
after childbirth.
We estimate this regression separately for each policy reform ðwhich we
index by the superscript MLÞ and separately by time since childbirth
ðwhich we index by the subscript tÞ. Our baseline regressions include all
mothers who give birth 3 months before or 3 months after a policy reform.
Because of measurement error in the child’s month of birth ðsee Sec. IV
and app. BÞ, we exclude mothers who give birth within 2 months of the
policy reform. Our control group consists of all mothers who give birth in
the same months but 1 year before or 1 year after the expansion in leave
coverage took place.12 For robustness, we also report, for some outcome
variables, results that include mothers who give birth and take maternity
leave 1 month or 6 months before or after an expansion in leave coverage
and results that use alternative control groups.13
There are two potential threats to this identification strategy. First, the
strategy would not be valid if women are able to time the birth of their
child as a response to the change in maternity leave legislation. The second
threat to our identification strategy is that mothers’ decision to sign up for
maternity leave may be influenced by the reform. The first threat seems
unlikely for reforms 1–4 since mothers could not precisely anticipate
these reforms: the draft bills for these reforms were proposed after the
children born within 3 months of the policy reform were conceived ðsee
Dustmann and Scho¨nberg ½2012 for detailsÞ. One might argue that some
discussion on these bills may have been in the public domain before the
draft bills were proposed. We searched two leading German newspapers
ðSu¨ddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter AllgemeineÞ for articles about the
reform. The first articles typically appeared no more than 2 months before
the reform was finally implemented. Women may nevertheless have some
possibilities to time the birth of their child through induced births or ce-
sarean sections. This, however, allows women to bring the birth date for-
ward,14 whereas in our case women would like to postpone childbirth in12 For reforms4 and5, our control group consists ofmotherswhogive birth 1year
ð2 yearsÞ before or 2 years ð1 yearÞ after the expansion in leave coverage; i.e., in our
baseline regression, our control group consists of allmotherswhogivebirthbetween
October 1990 and March 1991, and between October 1993 and March 1994.
13 In these regressions, we correct for the downward bias in our estimates caused
by the measurement error in the child’s birth month; see app. B for details.
14 Dickert-Conlin and Chandra ð1999Þ find that in order to qualify for tax ben-
efits, women in the United States are more likely to give birth in the last week of
December than in the first week of January, partly because of a more extensive use
of cesarean sections.
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Aorder to benefit from the more generous leave policy.15 The endogenous
timing of births is more problematic for reform 5, which was announced
1 year before it came into effect. The findings for reform 5 should there-
fore be interpreted with some caution.
Similarly, the second threat that mothers’ decision to sign up for ma-
ternity leave is affected by the expansion in leave coverage is unlikely to be
a concern for the first four unexpected policy reforms but could be prob-
lematic for the preannounced fifth expansion in leave coverage. The rea-
son is that women who are employed at a later stage of their pregnancy—
that is, when they learned about the expansion in leave coverage—have a
strong incentive to sign up for maternity leave irrespective of the length of
the job protection or maternity benefit period in order to receive their full
salary 6 weeks prior and 8 weeks after childbirth.
In order to further validate our identification strategy, in appendix ta-
ble A1 we compare mothers who give birth and go on maternity leave
3 months before an expansion in leave coverage with those who give birth
and sign up for maternity leave 3 months after an expansion in leave cov-
erage in terms of their observable prebirth characteristics. Specifically, we
estimate regressions of type ð1Þ, but with the mother’s age at birth, as well
as her log earnings, years of education, and full-time status around con-
ception ði.e., 9 months prior to childbirthÞ as dependent variables. While
differences are small for all policy reforms, three out of four differences
are statistically different from zero for the preannounced reform 5. This
emphasizes once more that our findings for reform 5 have to be interpreted
with some caution. We control for women’s prebirth characteristics in our
baseline regression, but including them in our regressions has hardly any
impact on our estimates.
IV. Data
Our data come from Social Security records, provided by the Institute
for Labor Market Research ðIABÞ in Nuremberg. The data allow us to
construct the complete work history—including time spent in unemploy-
ment and on leave of absence—of every man and woman covered by the
Social Security system. Not included in the data are civil servants ðinclud-
ing teachersÞ and the self-employed.16 From this database, we select all West15 Gans and Leigh ð2009Þ provide empirical evidence that women also have some
possibilities of delaying childbirth. They find that the introduction of a $3,000
“babybonus” inAustralia led to a drop in the number of births just before, and to an
increase just after, the policy commenced, although the policy was announced only
7weeks before its introduction.Our baseline regressions excludemothers who give
birth within 1 month of the policy reform because of measurement error in the
child’s month of birth. This exclusion also deals with this concern.
16 In 2001, 77.2% of all workers in the German economy were covered by Socia
Security and are hence recorded in the data ðBundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit 2004Þ.
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AGerman women who sign up for maternity leave between 1976 and 1994
and are between 16 and 45 years of age.
An important advantage of our data set is its large sample size; in our final
sample, there are at least 13,000 women who go on maternity leave each
month. This is crucial for our estimation strategy, which consists of com-
paring women who give birth just before and just after a change in ma-
ternity leave legislation. A further advantage is that, because of the admin-
istrative natureof the data, employment andearnings aremeasuredprecisely.
The main disadvantage of our data is that they do not contain direct in-
formation on children. We observe only whether and when a woman goes
on leave of absence. This causes two problems. First, not all leave takingmay
be maternity in nature. Alternative reasons for leave of absence include mil-
itary service, illness, disability, and early retirement. Our sample may thus
include some women who are on leave but have not given birth. Second,
we have to infer the child’s month of birth from the month the mother signs
up for leave of absence. Since women are entitled to go on maternity leave
6 weeks before their due date, we approximate the birthday of the child as
6 weeks after the mother went on leave. This is likely to lead to some mea-
surement error in the child’s month of birth.
Scho¨nberg ð2009Þ uses an additional data source, the IABS 75–95 Plus,
to address both problems. The IABS 75–95 Plus is a 1% random sample
drawn from our database, supplemented with precise information on
when a woman gives birth. Although this data set is principally available
from 1975 to 1995, reliable information on fertility exists only from 1986
on. Scho¨nberg first shows that after some appropriate restrictions are im-
posed, at least 90% of leave spells in the data are maternity in nature.17 In
appendix B, we argue that this type of measurement error is likely to lead
to a downward bias in our estimates of about 10%.
Scho¨nberg ð2009Þ further shows that the child’s month of birth, inferred
from the start of the mother’s leave spell, is correctly measured in at least
70% of the cases. In about 12% of the cases, the true month of birth is
either over- or underestimated by 1 month. In about 5% of the cases, the
true month of birth differs from the observed one by more than 1 month.
This type of measurement error implies that some women whom we re-
cord as giving birth 1 month before a change in maternity leave legislation
ðe.g., in December 1991Þ have in fact given birth after the change ðe.g., in
January 1992Þ, and vice versa. In our baseline regressions, we deal with this
type of measurement error by excluding mothers who give birth in the
month just before and after the change in maternity leave legislation ðe.g.,17 These restrictions are as follows: the leave spell must not start on January 1,
the leave spell must last at least 2 months, the leave spell must not be preceded by a
spell in apprenticeship training, and the leave spell must not be preceded by a spell
in unemployment.
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Ain December 1991 and January 1992Þ. This ensures that we assign the true
legislation to about 97.5% of mothers; see appendix B for details.
We consider a mother as having returned to the labor market if she
works for at least 2 consecutive months after childbirth. Full- and part-
time work are defined as working more than 30 hours and from 20 to
30 hours per week, respectively.18 Labor market income in month t after
childbirth is equal to earnings in month t if the mother is working in that
month and zero otherwise. To compute the mother’s cumulative total in-
come through month t after childbirth, we add up the mother’s monthly
total income in each month since childbirth. We define the mother’s
monthly total income in month t after childbirth as her monthly earnings
if she is working, as the maternity benefit if she is not working but is en-
titled to maternity benefits, and zero otherwise. We deflate earnings and
maternity benefits by the consumer price index, using 1995 as our base year.
Hence, income is measured in 1995 prices; that is, the maternity benefit of
DM 750 in 1979 is worth DM 1,190 in 1995 prices, compared to the DM
600 mothers are entitled to in 1995.
When evaluating the short-run effect of the policy reforms on mothers’
labor market outcomes after childbirth, we focus on outcomes 1 month
after the old leave period ended ðe.g., 3 months after childbirth for reform
1, which extended the job protection and maternity benefit period from
2 to 6 monthsÞ.19 In the tables, we note the short-run effects of the reforms
with an asterisk. When analyzing the long-run effects of the reforms, we
measure outcomes 16, 28, 40, . . . , 76 months after childbirth. This ensures
that for all women included in our baseline sample, outcomes refer to the
same calendar year.
V. Results
We first investigate the impact of the expansions in leave coverage on
women’s labor supply after childbirth ðSec. V.AÞ. We then turn to their im-
pact on income ðSec. V.BÞ.
Throughout the article, our results refer to mothers who sign up for
maternity leave as opposed to all mothers. In figure 2, we plot the share of
mothers who take somematernity leave. The vertical lines refer to themain
expansions in leave coverage, which we analyze in this article. We first
approximate this share as the ratio between the number of all births to18 Part-time jobs with less than 20 hours per week are not included in our data as
they are not covered by the Social Security system.
19 We measure outcomes 1 month after the end of the old leave period as op-
posed to right when the leave period ends because of measurement error in the
child’s month of birth. Since we over- or underestimate the child’s month of birth
by 1 month for roughly 30% of mothers ðsee app. BÞ, we observe some women
returning to work in month t1 1 after childbirth, although they in fact returned to
work 1 month earlier.
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FIG. 2.—Maternity leave take-up over time. The solid line ðor dotsÞ approxi-
ates the share of mothers who sign up for maternity leave as the number of
omen on leave in our data divided by the number of births in that year. This
easure is best interpreted as a lower bound for the true share as our data cover
nly 80% of the German workforce. The dashed line ðor diamondsÞ provides a
ore reliable estimate of the share of mothers who sign up for maternity leave
ased on the IABS 75–95 Plus. Vertical lines indicate the main expansions in leave
overage, which we analyze in this article. “JP” denotes the length of the job
rotection period, and “MB” denotes the length of the maternity benefit period.
ata source: Solid line: IAB Social Security data combined with Vital Statistics.
ashed Line: IABS 75–95 Plus.
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DGerman citizens and the number of women on maternity leave in our
data ðsolid lineÞ. There is a clear upward trend in leave taking: the share
increased from 31.5% in 1977 to 44.2% in 1993. These numbers probably
underestimate the incidence of leave taking as our data exclude up to 20%
of the German workforce. We provide a more reliable estimate based on
an additional data source, the IABS 75–95 Plus ðdashed lineÞ. As expected,
this data source reveals an almost 8 percentage point higher incidence of
leave taking.
A. Maternity Leave Legislation and Mothers’ Labor Supply
after Childbirth
1. Return to Work
In figure 3, we plot the share of women who have not returned to work
by month t after childbirth, separately for women who give birth 3 monthsThis content downloaded from 128.041.009.229 on December 11, 2017 08:41:22 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
FIG. 3.—Expansions in maternity leave coverage and mother’s return to the
labor market. The figures plot the share of mothers who have not returned to work
bymonth t after childbirth of mothers who give birth 3 months before or 3 months
after an expansion in maternity leave coverage. Because of measurement error in
the child’s month of birth, mothers who give birth 1 month before or 1 month after
an expansion in leave coverage are excluded from the sample. The vertical lines
refer to the length of the job protection or maternity benefit period before and
after the expansion in leave coverage. “JP” denotes the length of the job protection
period, and “MB” denotes the length of the maternity benefit period. Data source:
IAB Social Security records, mothers who signed up for maternity leave.
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Abefore and 3 months after a policy reform. We exclude mothers who give
birth 1 month before or 1 month after a policy reform. In each panel, the
solid vertical lines refer to the length of the job protection or maternity
benefit period before and after the expansion in leave coverage ðe.g., 2 and
6 months for reform 1Þ. The figures show that a considerable fraction ofThis content downloaded from 128.041.009.229 on December 11, 2017 08:41:22 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Amothers return to the labor market exactly at the end of the job protection
or maternity benefit period, that is, 2, 6, 10, 18, 24, or 36 months after
childbirth. This effect is stronger for the shorter leave periods of 2, 6, or
10 months ðreforms 1–3Þ than for the longer leave periods of 18, 24, and
36 months ðreforms 4 and 5Þ.
We provide more details in table 1, where we report, for our baseline
specification, difference-in-difference estimates based on regression ð1Þ.
In each panel, our dependent variable in the first row is an indicator var-
iable that is equal to one if the mother went back to work by the tth month
after childbirth. Reform 1—which increased both the job protection and
maternity benefit periods from 2 to 6 months after childbirth—lowered
the share of mothers who had returned to work by the third month af-
ter childbirth by 30.5 percentage points. Reforms 2 and 3—which in-
creased the job protection period from 6 to 10 months and the maternity
benefit period from 6 to 10 and from 6 to 22 months after childbirth, re-
spectively—led to a decline of similar magnitude in the probability that
the mother had reentered the labor market by month 7 after childbirth
ð27.5% and 30.3%Þ. Reform 4—which extended the job protection period
from 18 to 36 months and left the maternity benefit period unchanged at
18 months after childbirth—caused a reduction in the share of mothers
who had returned to work by month 19 after childbirth of 9.6 percentage
points, while reform 5—which raised the maternity benefit period from
18 to 24 months and left the job protection period unchanged at 36 months
after childbirth—led to a somewhat lower reduction in the share of moth-
ers who had gone back to work by month 24 after childbirth ð5.8%Þ. The
findings based on reform 4 highlight that mothers’ decision when to re-
turn to the labor market after childbirth is affected not only by the pay-
ment of maternity benefits but also by the job protection period.
What about the long-run effects of the expansions in leave on mothers’
return decision, after the job protection and maternity benefit periods of
the new policy ended? Reforms 1, 2, 4, and 5 slightly reduced the proba-
bility that the mother had gone back to work by months 52 and 76 after
childbirth by about 1–2 percentage points. Reform 3, which extended the
maternity benefit period beyond the job protection period, had a stronger
negative impact on the mother’s return decision and lowered the proba-
bility that she had reentered the labor market by months 52 and 76 after
childbirth by 4.5 and 3.8 percentage points, respectively.
We report robustness checks in appendix table A2. All specifications
give similar results. The only difference between estimates in the first rows
and our baseline estimates in table 1 is that we do not include mothers’
prebirth characteristics as control variables. In the second rows, our con-
trol group consists of mothers who give birth 1 year before ð1 year after
reform 5Þ the expansion in leave coverage came into effect, as opposed to
1 year before and 1 year after as in our baseline regressions. In the thirdThis content downloaded from 128.041.009.229 on December 11, 2017 08:41:22 AM
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Table 1
Expansions in Maternity Leave Coverage and Mothers’ Labor Force
Attachment after Childbirth
Reform 1: Job Protection: 2 → 6, Maternity Benefit:
2 → 6 ðMay 1979Þ ðN 5 182,679Þ
Months since Childbirth
3* 7 16 28 52 76
1. Share not returned to labor
market by 2.305 2.020 2.019 2.012 2.010 2.009
ð.004Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ
2. Share working in 2.284 .029 .007 .008 .011 .007
ð.004Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ
3. Number of months
worked through 2.597 21.091 2.959 2.873 2.672 2.495
ð.009Þ ð.024Þ ð.061Þ ð.109Þ ð.200Þ ð.289Þ
Reform 2: Job Protection: 6 → 10, Maternity Benefit:
6 → 10 ð January 1986, Excluding Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
ðN 5 171,243Þ
Months since Childbirth
7* 11 16 28 52 76
1. Share not returned to labor
market by 2.275 2.038 2.026 2.019 2.012 2.009
ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ 2ð.005Þ
2. Share working in 2.269 2.002 .001 .001 .008 .000
ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ
3. Number of months worked
through 2.512 21.038 21.033 21.050 2.965 2.951
ð.018Þ ð.033Þ ð.054Þ ð.104Þ ð.197Þ ð.285Þ
Reform 3: Job Protection: 6 → 10, Maternity Benefit:
6 → 22 ð January 1986, Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
ðN 5 36,025Þ
Months since Childbirth
7* 11* 16* 28 52 76
1. Share not returned to labor
market by 2.303 2.092 2.086 2.067 2.045 2.038
ð.010Þ ð.011Þ ð.011Þ ð.011Þ ð.011Þ ð.010Þ
2. Share working in 2.293 2.064 2.065 2.030 2.001 2.023
ð.010Þ ð.011Þ ð.011Þ ð.011Þ ð.011Þ ð.011Þ
3. Number of months worked
through 2.541 21.238 21.548 22.169 22.373 22.839
ð.039Þ ð.072Þ ð.117Þ ð.228Þ ð.429Þ ð.619Þ
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Reform 1: Job Protection: 2 → 6, Maternity Benefit:
2 → 6 ðMay 1979Þ ðN 5 182,679Þ
Months since Childbirth
3* 7 16 28 52 76
Reform 4: Job Protection: 18 → 36, Maternity Benefit:
18 → 18 ð January 1992, excluding
Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ ðN 5 218,089Þ
Months since Childbirth
7 19* 28* 40 52 76
1. Share not returned to labor
market by 2.007 2.096 2.085 2.023 2.022 2.008
ð.003Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ
2. Share working in 2.007 2.102 2.061 .017 .004 .013
ð.003Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ
3. Number of months
worked through 2.031 2.366 21.074 21.345 21.267 21.101
ð.016Þ ð.050Þ ð.077Þ ð.114Þ ð.151Þ ð.225Þ
Reform 5: Job Protection: 36 → 36, Maternity Benefit:
18 → 24 ð January 1993, excluding Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
ðN 5 214,868Þ
Months since Childbirth
7 19* 28 40 52 76
1. Share not returned to labor
market by 2.011 2.058 2.038 2.021 2.019 2.012
ð.003Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.005Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ
2. Share working in 2.010 2.069 2.027 2.006 2.008 .002
ð.003Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ
3. Number of months worked
through 2.072 2.373 2.819 2.972 21.043 21.094
ð.016Þ ð.051Þ ð.078Þ ð.114Þ ð.150Þ ð.224Þ
SOURCE.—IAB Social Security records, mothers who signed up for maternity leave.
NOTE.—The table reports difference-in-difference estimates based on regression ð1Þ for the impact of
five expansions in leave coverage on the probability that the mother has returned to work by month t after
childbirth ðrows 1Þ, on the probability that the mother is working in month t after childbirth ðrows 2Þ, and
on the number of months worked through month t since childbirth ðrows 3Þ. Results refer to our baseline
specification and include mothers who give birth 3 months before or 3 months after an expansion in leave
coverage. Owing to measurement error in the child’s month of birth, we exclude mothers who give birth
1 month before or 1 month after the expansion in leave coverage. The control group consists of mothers
who give birth in the same months but 1 year before ð2 years before for reform 5Þ or 1 year after ð2 years
after for reform 4Þ an expansion in leave coverage. Regressions control for mothers’ prebirth character-
istics. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* These cells represent the short-term effects of the expansions, referring to after the old and before the
new leave policy ends.
Table 1 ðContinuedÞ
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Arows, we restrict the sample to mothers who give birth 1 month before or
1 month after a policy reform. In order to correct for the attenuation bias
due to the measurement error in the child’s birthday, we divide our esti-
mates by 0.7, that is, the share of mothers for whom we correctly measure
their child’s month of birth ðsee app. B for a justificationÞ. In the fourth
rows, we widen the estimation sample to mothers who give birth 6 monthsThis content downloaded from 128.041.009.229 on December 11, 2017 08:41:22 AM
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Abefore or 6 months after an expansion in leave coverage and exclude, as in
our baseline specification,motherswho give birth 1month beforeor 1month
after an expansion in leave coverage.
2. Labor Force Participation Rates
Mothers may only temporarily return to the labor market after child-
birth and drop out of the labor market at a later stage, for instance, because
they have another child. A temporary return to work is common in our
sample. To give only one example, while 65% of mothers have returned to
work sometime after childbirth by the time their child is 6 years old, only
39% of mothers are actually employed at their child’s sixth birthday. In
order to provide a more complete picture of the impact of the expansions
in leave coverage on mothers’ labor supply after childbirth, we repeat the
analysis above, now using an indicator variable that is equal to one if the
mother is working in the tth month after childbirth as our dependent var-
iable ðrows 2 in table 1Þ. While both variables produce similar results with
respect to the short-run effects, they slightly differ with respect to the long-
run effects. Although each expansion deterred a small fraction of mothers
from returning to the labormarket by their child’s sixth birthday, reforms 1,
2, 4, and 5 did not significantly lower, and may even have slightly increased,
the probability that the mother is working 28 or 76 months after childbirth.
This suggests that the mothers who were deterred from reentering the labor
market by an expansion in leave coverage would have returned to the labor
market only temporarily if the reform had not taken place.20 The 95% con-
fidence intervals for the probability that the mother is working 76 months
after childbirth are ½20.003, 0.017 for reform 1, ½20.010, 0.010 for reform 2,
½0.005, 0.021 for reform 4, and ½20.006, 0.010 for reform 5. We find a small
long-lasting negative impact on mothers’ labor force participation rates only
for reform 3, which extended the maternity benefit period beyond the job
protection period; this reform reduced the probability that the mother is
employed 28 and 76months after childbirth by 3.0 and 2.3 percentage points,
respectively.
In the third rows of table 1, we report the impact of the expansions in
leave coverage on the number of months the mother has worked through
month t after childbirth. Reform 1 lowered the number of months the
mother has worked through month 7 after childbirth by 1.091 months,
compared to only 0.495month throughmonth 76 after childbirth. Reforms
2, 4, and 5 led to a somewhat larger decline in maternal employment
76months after childbirth of 0.951 month, 1.101 months, and 1.094months,
respectively. Reform 3 caused the strongest reduction in maternal employ-20 Lalive et al. ð2011Þ make a similar point.
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Ament: the number of months the mother has been employed through the
first 16 and 76months after childbirth decreased by 1.548 and 2.839months,
respectively.
3. Full-Time Work and Employer Continuity
Did the expansions in leave coverage affect full-time work after child-
birth? In rows 1 of table 2, we display, for our baseline specification,
difference-in-difference estimates based on regression ð1Þ, now using an
indicator variable that the mother is working full-time as our dependent
variable. The impact of the policy reforms on the probability that the
mother is working full-time right after the old job protection or mater-
nity benefit period ended ðe.g., 3 months after childbirth for reform 1Þ is
roughly one-third lower than the impact on the probability that the
mother is working ðfull-time or part-timeÞ at that time. For instance, re-
forms 1 and 2 reduced the probability that the mother is employed in
months 3 and 7 after childbirth by 28.4 and 26.9 percentage points ðtable 1,
rows 2Þ but lowered the probability that the mother is working full-time
by only 21.3 and 17.9 percentage points, respectively. This suggests that
roughly two-thirds of the short-run reduction in maternal employment
caused by the expansions in leave coverage is due to a reduction in full-
time work. The long-run effects of the policy reforms on full-time work,
after the new leave period ended, are close to zero and typically not sta-
tistically significant for reforms 1, 2, 4, and 5. For instance, the 95% con-
fidence intervals for the probability that the mothers are working full-
time in month 76 after childbirth are ½20.005, 0.011 for reform 1, ½20.011,
0.005 for reform 2, ½20.006, 0.006 for reform 4, and ½20.013,20.000 for
reform 5. Reform 3 had a somewhat larger negative impact on full-time
work in the long run and caused a reduction in the probability that the
mother is working 76 months after childbirth by 1.8 percentage points.
Did the expansions in leave coverage increase employer continuity? We
investigate this in rows 2 of table 2, where we report, for our baseline spec-
ification, difference-in-difference estimates based on regression ð1Þ, using as
our dependent variable the probability that the mother is employed at her
prebirth employer t months after childbirth. The impact of the policy re-
formson theprobability that themother isworking forherprebirth employer
right after the old job protection or maternity benefit period ended is only
slightly lower than the impact on the probability that the mother is working
at that time. For instance, reforms 3 and 4 decreased the probability that the
mother is employed 7 and 19 months after childbirth by 29.3 and 10.2 per-
centage points ðtable 1, rows 2Þ and reduced the probability that the mother
is working for her prebirth employer by 26.4 and 8.4 percentage points,
respectively. Hence, the majority of mothers who delay their return to the
labormarket as a result of an expansion in leave coveragewould have initiallyThis content downloaded from 128.041.009.229 on December 11, 2017 08:41:22 AM
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Table 2
Expansions in Maternity Leave Coverage, Mothers’ Full-Time Work
and Mothers’ Employer Continuity after Childbirth
Reform 1: Job Protection: 2 → 6, Maternity Benefit:
2 → 6 ðMay 1979Þ
Months since Childbirth
3* 7 16 28 52 76
1. Share working full-time 2.213 .034 .004 .004 .004 .003
ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ
2. Share working for prebirth
employer 2.259 .033 .010 .006 .008 .007
ð.004Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ
Reform 2: Job Protection: 6 → 10, Maternity Benefit:
6 → 10 ð January 1986, excluding Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
Months since Childbirth
7* 11 16 28 52 76
1. Share working full-time 2.179 .007 .001 2.001 .002 2.003
ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ
2. Share working for prebirth
employer 2.247 .004 .005 .004 .005 .005
ð.004Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ
Reform 3: Job Protection: 6 → 10, Maternity Benefit:
6 → 22 ð January 1986, Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
Months since Childbirth
7* 11* 16* 28 52 76
1. Share working full-time 2.188 2.033 2.037 2.017 2.005 2.018
ð.009Þ ð.010Þ ð.009Þ ð.009Þ ð.009Þ ð.009Þ
2. Share working for prebirth
employer 2.264 2.036 2.033 2.010 .000 2.007
ð.010Þ ð.011Þ ð.011Þ ð.010Þ ð.009Þ ð.009Þ
Reform 4: Job Protection: 18 → 36, Maternity Benefit:
18 → 18 ð January 1992, excluding Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
Months since Childbirth
7 19* 28* 40 52 76
1. Share working full-time 2.001 2.056 2.029 .005 .000 .000
ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ
2. Share working for prebirth
employer 2.007 2.084 2.043 .019 .008 .011
ð.003Þ ð.038Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ
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Reform 1: Job Protection: 2 → 6, Maternity Benefit:
2 → 6 ðMay 1979Þ
Months since Childbirth
3* 7 16 28 52 76
Reform 5: Job Protection: 36 → 36, Maternity Benefit:
18 → 24 ð January 1993, excluding Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
Months since Childbirth
7 19* 28 40 52 76
. Share working full-time 2.007 2.037 2.016 2.009 2.005 2.006
ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ
. Share working for prebirth
employer 2.006 2.055 2.021 2.002 2.003 .003
ð.003Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ
SOURCE.—IAB Social Security records.
NOTE.—The table reports difference-in-difference estimates based on regression ð1Þ for the impact of
ve expansions in leave coverage on the probability that the mother is working full-time in month t after
hildbirth ðrows 1Þ and on the probability that the mother is employed at her prebirth employer in month
after childbirth ðrows 2Þ. Results refer to our baseline specification and include mothers who give birth
months before or 3 months after an expansion in leave coverage. Owing to measurement error in the
hild’s month of birth, we exclude mothers who give birth 1 month before or 1 month after the expansion
leave coverage. The control group consists of mothers who give birth in the same months but 1 year
efore ð2 years before for reform 5Þ or 1 year after ð2 years after for reform 4Þ an expansion in leave
overage. Regressions control for prebirth characteristics. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* These cells represent the short-term effects of the expansions, referring to after the old and before the
ew leave policy ends.
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Treturned to their prebirth employer if the expansion had not taken place.
Neither policy reform—including reform 3, which expanded the maternity
benefit period beyond the job protection period and caused the largest re-
duction in maternal employment—had a strong impact on the probability
that the mother is working for her prebirth employer in the long run after
the new job protection or maternity benefit period ended. For instance, the
95% confidence intervals for the impact of the reforms on the probability
that the mother is employed by her prebirth employer 76 months after
childbirth are ½20.001, 0.015 for reform 1, ½20.003, 0.012 for reform 2,
½20.025, 0.011 for reform 3, ½0.003, 0.019 for reform 4, and ½20.005, 0.011
for reform 5.
B. Maternity Leave Legislation and Mothers’ Income
after Childbirth
How did the expansions in leave coverage affect mothers’ income after
childbirth?We first analyze the impact of the expansions in leave coverage
on mothers’ postbirth monthly labor market income, which we define as
their monthly earnings if they are employed and zero otherwise. We then
turn to the impact of the policy reforms on mothers’ cumulative income
obtained through month t after childbirth. This variable includes mater-
nity benefit payments if the mother is eligible. Finally, we restrict the
sample to employed mothers and investigate the impact of the expansions
in leave coverage on postbirth earnings for employed mothers.This content downloaded from 128.041.009.229 on December 11, 2017 08:41:22 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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We display difference-in-difference estimates for the effect of the pol
reforms on mothers’ postbirth labor market outcome in rows 1 of tabl
focusing on long-run effects after the new job protection or matern
benefit period ended. Results vary somewhat by policy reform. Reform
and 2 had very little impact on mothers’ long-run labor market inco
after childbirth. For instance, the 95% confidence intervals for the imp
on monthly labor market income 76 months after childbirth are clos
centered around zero ð½223.75, 29.57 for reform 1 and ½237.02, 27.36
reform 2Þ, with point estimates of DM 2.86 and 2DM 4.84, or 0.3% a
ðnegativeÞ 0.4%, respectively. The impact of reform 4 on monthly la
market income 52 and 76 months after childbirth is somewhat more p
itive ðDM 17.01 and DM 25.16, or 1.7% and 2.3%Þ, while that of reform
is somewhat more negative ð2DM 27.84 and 2DM 15.8, or ðnegati
2.7% and 1.4%, respectivelyÞ. However, these effects are mostly not s
tistically significant at conventional significance levels. Reform 3, wh
caused the largest reduction in maternal employment, also had the str
gest, and ðmostlyÞ statistically significant, negative impact on mothe
postbirth monthly labor market income: roughly DM 100, or ðnegati
8.5% 76 months after childbirth.
2. Cumulative Total Income
With the exception of reform 4, the expansions in leave coverage
tended the period during which maternity benefits are paid. Did the
tended payment of maternity benefits compensate mothers, on avera
for any loss in labor market income? We investigate this in rows 2 of
ble 3, where we report difference-in-difference estimates for the effect
the expansions in leave coverage on mothers’ cumulative total incom
including that from maternity benefit payments, obtained through mo
t after childbirth.
Results again vary by policy reform.Reform1 increased cumulative to
income by roughly DM 2,000 frommonth 16 to month 76 after childbir
This is an average effect and masks important distributional effects. T
cumulative income of mothers who delay their return to work beca
of the reform declines as a result of the reform, as the monthly matern
benefit of DM 750 corresponds to only 55% of mothers’ average postbi
salary. However, mothers who do not return to work within 6 mon
of their child’s birth under either leave policy receive DM 750 for 4 ad
tional months after the reform. Our results indicate that the latter eff
dominates the first effect.
Reform 2, which extended the maternity benefit period by 4 mon
but lowered the monthly maternity benefit from DM 750 to DM 600,
creasedmothers’ cumulative total income by about DM900 after childbi
Reform 4, which extended only the job protection period and left the ma- AM
icago.edu/t-and-c).
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Aternity benefit period unchanged, led to a larger reduction in mothers’ cu-
mulative total income 52 and 76 months after childbirth of DM 2,751
and DM 2,323, respectively. Reform 5, which extended only the maternity
benefit period and left the job protection period unchanged, increased
mothers’ cumulative total income by DM 1,050 initially 28 months after
childbirth. However, because of the negative ðalbeit smallÞ impact of the
reform on mothers’ postbirth labor market income, this positive effect
vanishes and even becomes negative by the time the child is 76 months old.
Similarly, reform 3, which extended the job protection period from 6 to
10 months and the maternity benefit period from 6 to 22 months, had little
impact onmothers’ cumulative total income initially 16 and 28 months after
childbirth. However, the reform caused a reduction in mothers’ cumulative
total income of almost DM 4,000 by the time the child is 76 months old.
3. Labor Market Income of Employed Mothers
For completeness, we display in rows 3 of table 3 difference-in-difference
estimates for the impact of the expansions in leave coverage on the monthly
labor market income ðin logsÞ of employed mothers. It is important to bear
in mind that these estimates may suffer from a selection bias as the expan-
sions in leave coverage may have changed the type of women who are work-
ing after childbirth.21 While there is some evidence that reform 1 reduced
postbirth labor market income of employed mothers 28 and 52 months
after childbirth by 1–2 percentage points ðan effect that is statistically
significant at the 10% levelÞ, reforms 2, 4, and 5 had no statistically sig-
nificant impact on employed mothers’ labor market income after child-
birth. The 95% confidence intervals for the ðlogÞ labor market income
52 months after childbirth are ½20.027, 0.004 for reform 1, ½20.020, 20.008
for reform 2, ½20.010, 0.014 for reform 4, and ½20.014, 0.010 for reform 5.
In contrast, reform 3 lowered postbirth labor market income of employed
mothers by around 3 percentage points. Hence, the negative effect of this
reform on mothers’ labor market income after childbirth in row 1 of table 3
is driven not only by the negative effect on mothers’ postbirth employment
rates but also by lower wages of employed mothers.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
This article evaluates the impact of five major expansions in maternity
leave coverage in Germany on mothers’ labor market outcomes after child-21 Note that the positive and statistically significant effect of reform 4 on log
earnings of employed mothers 28 months after childbirth ði.e., before the new job
protection period endsÞ is likely due to a selection effect, as mothers who are
employed 28 months after childbirth, although they are entitled to 36 months of
job-protected leave, are likely to be positively selected compared to mothers who
are employed 28 months after childbirth and entitled to only 18 months of job-
protected leave.
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Table 3
Expansions in Maternity Leave Coverage and Mothers’ Income
after Childbirth
Reform 1: Job Protection: 2 → 6, Maternity Benefit:
2 → 6 ðMay 1979Þ
Months since Childbirth
16 28 52 76
1. Monthly labor market income 9.72 8.35 5.76 2.91
ð13.50Þ ð13.29Þ ð13.15Þ ð13.60Þ
2. Cumulative total income 1,935.32 2,016.46 2,169.78 2,161.64
ð171.49Þ ð309.09Þ ð571.00Þ ð833.70Þ
3. Monthly log earnings, employed
mothers 2.005 2.013 2.024 2.011
ð.006Þ ð.007Þ ð.007Þ ð.008Þ
Reform 2: Job Protection: 6 → 10, Maternity Benefit
6→ 10 ð January 1986, excluding Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
Months since Childbirth
16 28 52 76
1. Monthly labor market income 21.20 21.74 16.86 24.87
ð15.06Þ ð15.12Þ ð15.67Þ ð16.42Þ
2. Cumulative total income 2794.53 2916.45 2879.74 2898.91
ð159.96Þ ð315.91Þ ð618.91Þ ð925.99Þ
3. Monthly log earnings, employed
mothers 2.005 2.004 2.006 2.007
ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.007Þ ð.007Þ
Reform 3: Job Protection: 6 → 10, Maternity Benefit
6 → 22 ðJanuary 1986, Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
Months since Childbirth
16* 28 52 76
1. Monthly labor market income 2163.57 2111.32 254.95 297.37
ð31.87Þ ð32.11Þ ð33.10Þ ð34.19Þ
2. Cumulative total income 29.81 2190.06 21,886.96 23,919.66
ð325.03Þ ð650.08Þ ð1,293.65Þ ð1,944.56Þ
3. Monthly log earnings, employed
mothers 2.007 2.037 2.050 2.028
ð.013Þ ð.015Þ ð.017Þ ð.017Þ
Reform 4: Job Protection: 18→ 36, Maternity Benefit
18→ 18 ð January 1992, excluding Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
Months since Childbirth
28* 40 52 76
1. Monthly labor market income 2137.19 57.20 17.01 25.16
ð12.22Þ ð13.61Þ ð13.78Þ ð14.10Þ
2. Cumulative total income 22,633.70 23,019.59 22,751.65 22,323.98
ð239.75Þ ð367.08Þ ð495.79Þ ð758.05Þ
3. Monthly log earnings, employed
mothers .022 .005 .002 2.012
ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ
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Reform 5: Job Protection: 36→ 36, Maternity Benefit:
18→ 24 ð January 1993, excluding Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
Months since Childbirth
28 40 52 76
1. Monthly labor market income 257.89 225.16 227.84 215.88
ð13.37Þ ð13.92Þ ð13.97Þ ð14.50Þ
2. Cumulative total income 1,050.41 694.73 287.27 290.09
ð240.61Þ ð368.32Þ ð497.52Þ ð763.64Þ
3. Monthly log earnings, employed
mothers .011 2.011 2.002 2.002
ð.007Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ
SOURCE.—IAB Social Security records, mothers who signed up for maternity leave.
NOTE.—The table reports difference-in-difference estimates based on regression ð1Þ for the impact of
five expansions in leave coverage on mothers’ labor market income in month t after childbirth ðrows 1Þ; on
mothers’ cumulative total income, including maternity benefits, obtained through month t after childbirth
ðrows 2Þ; and on log earnings of employed mothers in month t after childbirth ðrows 3Þ. Results refer to
our baseline specification and include mothers who give birth 3 months before or 3 months after an
expansion in leave coverage. Owing to measurement error in the child’s month of birth, we exclude
mothers who give birth 1 month before or 1 month after the expansion in leave coverage. The control
group consists of mothers who give birth in the same months but 1 year before ð2 years before for reform 5Þ
or 1 year after ð2 years after for reform 4Þ an expansion in leave coverage. Regressions control for mothers’
prebirth characteristics. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* These cells represent the short-term effects of the expansions, referring to after the old and before the
new leave policy ends.
Table 3 ðContinued Þ
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Abirth. An important goal of the reforms was to encourage mothers to spend
more time with their infants after childbirth, a time that is crucial for the
child’s development. The reforms achieved this goal: each expansion in leave
coverage lowered maternal employment in the short run. Our findings for
reforms 4 and 5, which increased only the job protection or maternity
benefit period, respectively, further highlight that mothers’ decision when
to return to work after childbirth is influenced not only by job protection
but also by the payment of maternity benefits.
The impact of the expansions in leave coverage on overall maternal em-
ployment is, however, small. For instance, reforms 1 and 2 increased both
the job protection and maternity benefit periods by 4 months but lowered
the number of months the mother worked through the first 6 years after
childbirth by less than 1 month. Reform 3, which expanded the job pro-
tection period by 4 months and the maternity benefit period by 16 months,
had the strongest impact onmaternal employment and reduced the number
of months the mother worked in the first 6 years after childbirth by almost
3 months.
Despite the considerable short-term effects of the reforms on mothers’
employment rates after childbirth, four out of five expansions in leave
coverage had only a small impact onmothers’ employment rates, employerThis content downloaded from 128.041.009.229 on December 11, 2017 08:41:22 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Acontinuity, and labor market income in the long run, 3–6 years after
childbirth. This suggests that the reductions in maternal employment in-
duced by these reforms were too small to result in a large depreciation of
the mother’s stock of human capital and hence in lower postbirth em-
ployment rates and labor market income. This further suggests that the
reforms did not lead to improvements in mothers’ specific capital after
childbirth that are large enough to lead to substantially higher postbirth
employment rates and labor market income.
The common feature of these reforms is that the job protection period is
as long as or exceeds the maternity benefit period. Our findings based on
reform 3, which increased the maternity benefit period beyond the job
protection period, point toward the importance of job protection in avoid-
ing long-lasting negative effects of expansions in maternity leave coverage.
There is some evidence that this reform worsened women’s position in the
labor market after childbirth. It deterred up to 4% of mothers from return-
ing to work within the first 6 years after childbirth, lowered mothers’ labor
market income by roughly 8%, and reduced earnings of employed mothers
by about 3% 2–6 years after childbirth. Furthermore, the reform caused
a decline in mothers’ cumulative total income, including that frommaternity
benefit payments, by almost DM 4,000 6 years after childbirth, although the
state government spent approximatelyDM6,000 ðin 1995 pricesÞ permother,
on average, on additional maternity benefit payments.
These findings are highly relevant for the current debate on the design
of social assistance and welfare programs. In particular, the changes in US
welfare and tax policy between 1984 and 1996 were designed to encourage
work by single mothers, and an important motivation behind the changes
was that time away from work may lower women’s future labor market
attachment ðsee, e.g., Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Blank 2002Þ.
To conclude, the expansions in maternity leave coverage that were im-
plemented in Germany since the late 1970s achieved their goal of increas-
ing the time mothers spend with their infants after childbirth, a time that
is crucial for the child’s development. However, the expansions failed at
improving mothers’ labor market attachment and income in the long run,
2–6 years after childbirth.This content downloaded from 128.041.009.229 on December 11, 2017 08:41:22 AM
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AAppendix A
Additional Results
Table A1
Expansions in Leave Coverage and Mothers’ Prebirth CharacteristicsThis content downloaded from 128.0
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press TermAge41.009.229
s and ConðLogÞ
Earnings on Decemb
ditions (httpEducationer 11, 2017 08
://www.journFull-TimeReform 1: job protection: 2 → 6, maternity
benefit: 2 → 6 ðMay 1979Þ:February–July, excluding April and May
ðN 5 182,679Þ .070 2.006 .003 .001ð.053Þ ð.004Þ ð.020Þ ð.003Þ
Reform 2: job protection: 6→ 10, maternity
benefit: 6→ 10 ð January 1986, excluding
Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ:
October–March, excluding January and
December ðN 5 171,236Þ 2.037 .003 .046 .000ð.055Þ ð.005Þ ð.020Þ ð.004Þ
Reform 3: job protection: 6→ 10, maternity
benefit: 6 → 22 ð January 1986, Baden-
Wu¨rttembergÞ:October–March, excluding January and
December ðN 5 36,025Þ .005 .014 .005 .007ð.114Þ ð.010Þ ð.043Þ ð.008Þ
Reform 4: Job Protection: 18 → 36,
Maternity Benefit: 18 → 18
ð January 1992, excluding Baden-
Wu¨rttembergÞ:October–March, excluding January and
December ðN 5 218,089Þ 2.086 2.008 .011 .004ð.056Þ ð.005Þ ð.017Þ ð.004Þ
Reform 5: job protection: 36 → 36,
maternity benefit: 18 → 24 ðJanuary
1993, excluding Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ:October–March, excluding January and
December ðN 5 214,868Þ 2.124 .004 .044 .010ð.046Þ ð.004Þ ð.017Þ ð.004Þ
SOURCE.—IAB Social Security records, mothers who signed up for maternity leave.
NOTE.—The table reports difference-in-difference estimates based on regression ð1Þ, using as dependent
variables the mother’s age at childbirth, as well as her ðlogÞ earnings, years of education, and full-time
status around conception ði.e., 9 months prior to childbirthÞ. Results refer to our baseline specification and
include mothers who give birth 3 months before or 3 months after an expansion in leave coverage.
Mothers who give birth 1month before or 1 month after the expansion in leave coverage are excluded. The
control group consists of mothers who give birth in the same months but 1 year before ð2 years before for
reform 5Þ or 1 year after ð2 years after for reform 4Þ an expansion in leave coverage. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.:41:22 AM
als.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Expansions in Leave Coverage and Mothers’ Return to Work:
Robustness ChecksThis content downloaded from 
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.journals.u761. February–July, excluding April and
May, no controls ðcontrol group:
1 year before/after, N 5 182,679Þ 2.030 2.020 2.019 2.012 2.010 2.009ð.004Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ
2. February–July, excluding April and
May, controls ðcontrol group:
1 year before, N 5 113,536Þ 2.299 2.018 2.020 2.016 2.011 2.011ð.005Þ ð.004Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ
3. April–May, controls ðcontrol
group: 1 year before/after,
N 5 98,730Þ 2.218 2.018 2.012 2.006 2.005 2.004ð.006Þ ð.007Þ ð.007Þ ð.007Þ ð.007Þ ð.007Þ
Corrected 2.311 2.025 2.017 2.009 2.006 2.0054. November–October, excluding
April and May, controls ðcontrol
group: 1 year before/after,
N 5 460,347Þ 2.294 2.022 2.016 2.009 2.008 2.006ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ
Reform 2: Job Protection: 6 → 10, Maternity
Benefit: 6 → 10 ðJanuary 1986, excluding
Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
Months since Childbirth7* 11 16 28 52 761. October–March, excluding
December and January, no controls
ðcontrol group: 1 year before/after,
N 5 171,243Þ 2.276 2.039 2.026 2.020 2.012 2.009ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ
2. October–March, excluding
December and January, controls
ðcontrol group: 1 year before,
N 5 110,585Þ 2.278 2.041 2.023 2.017 2.011 2.009ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ
3. January–December, controls
ðcontrol group: 1 year before/after,
N 5 90,805Þ 2.198 2.033 2.028 2.021 2.008 2.009ð.007Þ ð.007Þ ð.007Þ ð.007Þ ð.007Þ ð.007Þ
Corrected 2.282 2.047 2.039 2.030 2.011 2.0124. July–June, excluding December and
January, controls ðcontrol group:
1 year before/after, N 5 456,747Þ 2.273 2.057 2.044 2.033 2.023 2.020ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ:22 AM
chicago.edu/t-and-c).
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.journals.u76Reform 3: Job Protection: 6 → 10, Maternity
Benefit: 6 → 22 ð January 1986,
Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
Months since Childbirth7* 11* 16* 28 52 761. October–March, excluding
December and January, no controls
ðcontrol group: 1 year before/after,
N 5 36,025Þ 2.303 2.091 2.085 2.066 2.044 2.038ð.010Þ ð.011Þ ð.011Þ ð.011Þ ð.011Þ ð.010Þ
2. October–March, excluding
December and January, controls
ðcontrol group: 1 year before,
N 5 23,160Þ 2.323 2.111 2.098 2.076 2.055 2.052ð.012Þ ð.013Þ ð.013Þ ð.013Þ ð.013Þ ð.012Þ
3. January–December, controls
ðcontrol group: 1 year before/
after, N 5 19,089Þ 2.197 2.043 2.046 2.048 2.043 2.037ð.014Þ ð.015Þ ð.015Þ ð.015Þ ð.015Þ ð.015Þ
Corrected 2.282 2.061 2.065 2.069 2.062 2.0534. July–June, excluding December and
January, controls ðcontrol group:
1 year before/after, N 5 96,993Þ 2.289 2.093 2.086 2.072 2.052 2.040ð.006Þ ð.007Þ ð.007Þ ð.007Þ ð.007Þ ð.006Þ
Reform 4: Job Protection: 18 → 36, Maternity
Benefit: 18 → 18 ð January 1992, excluding
Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
Months since Childbirth7 19* 28* 40 52 761. October–March, excluding
December and January, no controls
ðcontrol group: 1 year before,
2 years after, N 5 218,089Þ 2.008 2.098 2.087 2.025 2.023 2.009ð.003Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ
2. October–March, excluding
December and January, controls
ðcontrol group: 1 year before,
N 5 150,067Þ 2.005 2.092 2.087 2.025 2.021 2.008ð.004Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ
3. January–December, controls
ðcontrol group: 1 year before,
2 years after, N 5 118,696Þ 2.005 2.074 2.071 2.027 2.025 2.014ð.004Þ ð.057Þ ð.007Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ
Corrected 2.007 2.106 2.102 2.039 2.036 2.0204. July–June, excluding December and
January, controls ðcontrol group:
1 year before, 2 years after,
N 5 581,264Þ 2.006 2.098 2.090 2.025 2.025 2.009ð.002Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ:22 AM
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.journals.76Reform 5: Job Protection: 36 → 36, Maternity
Benefit: 18 → 24 ð January 1993, excluding
Baden-Wu¨rttembergÞ
Months since Childbirth7 19* 28 40 52 761. October–March, excluding
December and January, no controls
ðcontrol group: 2 years before,
1 year after, N 5 214,868Þ 2.013 2.060 2.039 2.022 2.019 2.012ð.003Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.004Þ
2. October–March, excluding
December and January, controls
ðcontrol group: 1 year after,
N 5 140,282Þ 2.012 2.066 2.040 2.021 2.021 2.013ð.004Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ ð.005Þ
3. January–December, controls
ðcontrol group: 2 years before,
1 year after, N 5 117,951Þ 2.007 2.050 2.036 2.016 2.014 2.012ð.004Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ
Corrected 2.010 2.072 2.052 2.023 2.020 2.0174. July–June, excluding December
and January, controls ðcontrol
group: 2 years before, 1 year
after, N 5 574,858Þ 2.012 2.057 2.031 2.016 2.016 2.005ð.002Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.003Þ
SOURCE.—IAB Social Security records, mothers who signed up for maternity leave.
NOTE.—The table reports robustness checks for the impact of five expansions in leave coverage on the
probability that the mother has returned to work by month t since childbirth. The only difference
between estimates in rows 1 and our baseline estimates in table 1 is that we do not include mothers’
prebirth characteristics as control variables. In rows 2, our control group consists of mothers who give
birth 1 year before ð1 year after for reform 5Þ the expansion in leave coverage came into effect, as opposed
to 1 year before or 1 year after as in our baseline regressions. In rows 3, we restrict the sample to mothers
who give birth 1 month before or 1 month after a policy reform. In order to correct for the attenuation
bias due to the measurement error in the child’s birthday, we divide our estimates by 0.7, i.e. the share of
mothers for whom we correctly measure their child’s month of birth; see app. B for details. In rows 4, we
widen the estimation sample to mothers who give birth 6 months before or 6 months after an expansion
in leave coverage and exclude, as in our baseline specification, mothers who give birth 1 month before or
1 month after an expansion. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* These cells represent the short-term effects of the expansions, referring to after the old and before the
new leave policy ends.:22 AM
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AAppendix B
Measurement Error
Consider first the first type of measurement error; that is, not all leave
spells are maternity in nature. For ease of exposition, we focus on the 1992
policy reform that extended job-protected leave from 18 to 36months. For
simplicity, we show our results for the simple difference ðafter vs. beforeÞ
estimator. Our arguments also apply to the difference-in-difference esti-
mator in equation ð1Þ.
Let Y truei and Y
other
i denote the labor market outcome of women ðwhich
we index by the subscript iÞ who take a leave of absence because of child-
birth or for other reasons, respectively. The proportion of women who are
onmaternity leave because they gavebirth is denotedbyp. Scho¨nberg ð2009Þ
shows that this proportion is uncorrelated with the month the leave spell
started and is thus uncorrelated with the leave policy to which the mother is
entitled. The expected difference between labormarket outcomes ofwomen
who are observed to take a leave of absence before or after a change in ma-
ternity leave legislation ðe.g., betweenOctober 1991 andMarch 1992Þ equals
E½YijML5 362 E½YijML5 18
5 pðE½Y truei jML5 362 E½Y truei jML5 36Þ
1 ð12 pÞðE½Yotheri jML5 362 E½Yotheri jML5 36Þ:
If labor market outcomes of women who take a leave of absence for rea-
sons other than childbirth are unaffected by the expansion in leave coverage,
that is, if
E½Yotheri jML5 365 E½Yotheri jML5 36;
this simplifies to
E½YijML5 362 E½YijML5 18
5 pðE½Y truei jML5 362 E½Y truei jML5 36Þ:
Using the IABS 75–95 Plus, Scho¨nberg ð2009Þ shows that this assumption
holds and that p ≈ 0.9. Hence, this type of measurement error leads to an
attenuation bias of approximately 10%.
Next, consider the second type of measurement error, that is, the
mismeasurement in the maternity leave legislation the mother is entitled
to, driven by the mismeasurement in the child’s month of birth. For
simplicity, we ignore the first type of measurement error. Let q denote the
probability that the true maternity leave policy to which the mother is
entitled is equal to the leave policy we observe in the data. Scho¨nberg
ð2009Þ shows that this probability is largely uncorrelated with the monthThis content downloaded from 128.041.009.229 on December 11, 2017 08:41:22 AM
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Athe mother gives birth and thus with the maternity leave policy. The
expected difference between labor market outcomes of women who are
observed to give birth before or after the change in legislation in the data
equals
E½YijML5 362 E½YijML5 18
5 ð2q2 1ÞðE½Y truei jML5 362 E½Y truei jML5 36Þ:
The proportion of women for whom we correctly assign the leave policy
depends on the sample restrictions. If the sample is restricted to mothers
who give birth within 1 month of the policy reform, q ≈ 0.85, leading to an
attenuation bias of about 30%.22 If mothers who give birth within 1 month
of the policy reform are excluded from the sample, q ≈ 0.975, leading to
an attenuation bias of approximately 5%.
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